QUOTE(gsdfan @ Sep 30 2009, 01:38 PM)
I beg to differ. Interbreeding produces defective gene and how on earth are you going to trace your child's root? I agree with you partially but there has to be at least some order in procreation to prevent breeding from similar lineage.
That's why Sparta lose to the ROME, due to their lack of intelligence from close breeding unlike the Romans which is made up of the Achaean, Macedonian, Cretan, Rhodian, and Pergamese soldiers.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_against_NabisYou are wrong about the downfall of Sparta.
I had a look at Sparta's history after hearing about that idiotic propaganda film "300" in which many stupid Malaysians thought highly of.
Contrary to the film, Sparta was the BIGGEST slave owning society in the Mediterranean at the time, and routinely participated in acts of terror called the "krypteia", where Spartans coming of age would go into the wildnerness to stalk, rape and murder the defenceless population of helots that labored for the military class in Sparta.
The Spartans were also rampant homosexuals, as sexual contact with women was forbidden until a man had proved himself. In substitution "pederasty" and homosexual lust was encouraged as an outlet.
Sparta was a militaristic caste society where it's citizens, both men and women were trained from birth for warfare and attrition. In order to distinguish themselves from the helots and other slaves citizenry was based on strict HEREDITARY rules to ensure that Sparta remained firmly in the hands of Spartans themselves.
Did inbreeding and such strict hereditary rules of citizenship cause the downfall of Sparta? Yes, but not in the way that you think.
Simply put: the helot population boomed despite the regular massacres and acts of terror and repression, and even though many uprisings were put down the Spartans found it more and more difficult to manage their slave labor. Where before the use of slaves helped focus the Spartans on playing the game of domination in the Mediterranean, now they were spending more time "handling" the helots themselves even while city states like Athens were growing in power and influence.
As for the Spartan population itself? It stagnated because it was a society closed to outsiders, but their own political base could not grow as fast via births as compared to the others than used a more sophisticated form o politics.
Even so, Spartan power remained military power remained formidable. They had a class of professional, trained, hardnened killers where the other city states struggled to build a full time military and navy.
Spartan mythology prides itself as having never been defeated in battle and having never been invaded and subjugated. The real truth however is nowhere near as glorious.
In the 4th century BC the Boetian League under the leadership of Thebes rose to prominence and challenged Spartan hegemony in the region that had waned following the successful Peloponnesian wars. War was declared. The Spartans marched on the Boetian league and took its field forces by surprise and with numerical superiority. So fearsome was the reputation of Spartan martial skill that the Boetian generals were divided as to whether to contest the field or be driven from it. In the end, the warrior-statesman Epaminondas of Thebes prevailed.
Traditionally, hoplites were arranged in phalanxes twelve men deep, with the best fighters on the right wing. The aim was to engage the enemy simulaneously in a solid, well coordinated spear and shield line and attrite them to the point that their own formations broke down and they were reduced to a rout. The strongest and best fighters were placed on the right wing as this was the best position for them to fight in a phalanx. Against phalanxes of a similar formation the battles would degenerate into the two armies locked in battle with one another but also circling as the stronger right flanks of both armies pushed back the left. To prevail, the phalanxes would have to wheel and preserve formation or rish envelopment. The Spartans were so well trained and drilled that they have never lost a battle.
Epaminondas broke with military tradition and used the principle of concentration of forces in order to counter Spartan military superiority.
He massed his best soldiers FIFTY deep on the LEFT flank to face the Spartan elite that was only twelve deep, and his weaker troops were distributed towards the rightwards side solely to act in a holding action, locking the enemy in combat and preventing easy maneuver and redeployment.
His cavalry was massed behind his left flank as a tactical reserve.
The armies marched on each other and clashed. On the Spartan left the Boetians were pushed back in battle by superior strength and skill.
But on the Spartan right, Sparta's elite staggered against the weight of the men thrown at it. Sparta's phalanx first showed signs of cracking, but because Sparta had no tactical reserve, additional forces could not be added to the battle without being withdrawn from battle elsewhere. In this, the Spartan left were hindered from redeploying by the Boetian right that had been pushed back but were still holding their ground and still giving battle. Perhaps an attempt was made to disengage some forces and remaneuver, but even if this was attempted, it was unsuccessful, or did not reach the critical area in time.
The Spartan line cracked, and then broke. Cavalry poured through to exploit the gap and attack the enemy from the rear, infantry forced the Spartan right back while others streamed through gaps to divide and encircle the Spartans.
The result was a total rout and the complete destruction of half it's army's fighting force, not to mention almost its ENTIRE logistics and supply train, with the lost of materials and supplies.
The Spartans retreated and were UNABLE to replace these combat losses. Thereafter the Spartans were overshadowed not just militarily with it's navy being sidelined, its control over its own helot population waned and the other powers of the Mediterranean took over the power vacuum ensuing from the Spartan retreat and reclusement. Spartan borders shrank and Sparta simply became irrelevant.
When Philip of Macedon became the overlord of Greece Sparta had already become an uninteresting backwater, a little plot of land worth nothing compared to the riches, influence and sheer vitality that the other Greek states possessed.
This was how Sparta avoided total defeat in battle: by the stroke of luck of having the enemy political leadership killed in action, by losing a war and retreating to its own borders, by losing influence and the ability to project force, by slowly fading into obscurity.