Oh ASEAN,

bet malaysia armed forces could only look at envy

Hmm my reporter friend is on Stennis. Anyone know how come there's a press pool on board with reporters from Msia?

Welp, fingers crossed for Typhoon... hopefully...

“Unreliable evidence is clouding the international discourse on the South China Sea disputes.”

Consider, for instance, the argument that China, far from being the aggressor in the South China Sea

Vietnam has “doubled its holdings” in the South China Sea in the past 20 years

Even if one assumes that Vietnam occupied 24 features in 1996 (the actual data from which the map often drawn for this line of argument actually specifies 22)

The source for this claim – a 2015 congressional testimony by a senior U.S. defense official – in fact specified 48 outposts amongst the features occupied by Vietnam in the Spratly Islands, rather than 48 features. Using a 20-year timeline is also equally misleading because it leaves out China’s seizure of Mischief Reed 21 years ago

Vietnam

Vietnam currently occupies 21 features in the Spratly Islands, with the latest taken a few days after a bloody clash on March 14, 1988 with China at Johnson South Reef. A full list of these features with their names and coordinates was publicized in the April 22, 1988 issue of Nhan Dan, the Vietnamese government’s mouthpiece. They are:

Southwest Cay (Vietnamese: Song Tu Tay),
South Reef (Da Nam),
Petley Reef (Nui Thi or Da Thi),
Sand Cay (Son Ca),
Namyit Island (Nam Yet),
Discovery Great Reef (Da Lon),
Sin Cowe Island (Sinh Ton),
Collins Reef (Co Lin),
Lansdowne Reef (Len Dao),
Sin Cowe East Island (Sinh Ton Dong),
Ladd Reef (Da Lat),
Spratly Island (Truong Sa or Truong Sa Lon),
West Reef (Da Tay),
Central Reef (Truong Sa Dong),
East Reef (Da Dong),
Pearson Reef (Phan Vinh),
Allison Reef (Toc Tan),
Cornwallis South Reef (Nui Le),
Pigeon or Tennent Reef (Tien Nu),
Barque Canada Reef (Thuyen Chai),
Amboyna Cay (An Bang).

S. Department of Defense (DoD) identified 34 outposts on these 21 features

Vietnam also has a similar counting system, but it identifies only 33 outposts (diem dong quan or diem dao in Vietnamese). Why the discrepancy? The extra outpost counted by DoD is a lighthouse on Tennent Reef

Philippines

Philippine media typically reports either nine or ten Philippine-held features in the Spratly Islands. The tenth feature is Irving Reef (Filipino: Balagtas), which lies between Loaita Bank and West York Island. There are no structures on this reef, but unverified sources report that Philippine Navy ships take turns to guard the feature. If this is true, the status of Irving is similar to that of several other features that are watched by Chinese and Vietnamese vessels but remain unoccupied.

Given this, the nine features held by the Philippines in the Spratly Islands are:

Northeast Cay (Filipino: Parola),
Thitu Island (Pag-asa),
Loaita Cay (Panata),
Loaita Island (Kota),
West York Island (Likas),
Flat Island (Patag),
Nanshan Island (Lawak),
Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin),
Commodore Reef (Rizal).

APMSS map shows no outpost at Lankiam Cay. Instead, it locates the second Philippine outpost in Loaita Bank at an unidentified reef northwest of Loaita Island. Some Chinese and Vietnamese sources identify this Philippine-occupied feature as Loaita Nan. However, the coordinates commonly associated with Loaita Nan (100 42.5’ N, 1140 19.5’ E) refer to the reef that forms the western edge of Loaita Bank, where no structures are visible from satellite images available in Google Maps. At the same time, small structures are visible on Loaita Cay (100 44’ N, 1140 21’ E), which might be thought of as part of Loaita Nan but actually lies east across a seven-meter deep channel. Loaita Cay is 6.5 nm northwest of Loaita Island

Between 1970 and 1978, the Philippine moved in to occupy seven features in the Spratlys, with troops stationed on five islands. Flat Island, which lies about 6 nm north of Nanshan Island, appeared to be controlled by a garrison based at Nanshan until 2011, when some starshell-like structures were built on Flat to house a more permanent presence. A documentary produced by a local TV network in 2004 reported that only four soldiers were guarding both features from their shelters on Nanshan

In 1999, the Philippines occupied Second Thomas Shoal by running the tank landing ship BRP Sierra Madre aground and using it as a shelter for a small garrison. Of note, the Pentagon does not count the Philippine station on Second Thomas Shoal as an outpost

Taiwan

Itu Aba Island (Chinese: 太平島) is the only feature occupied by Taiwan in the Spratlys. It is also the largest natural land feature in the archipelago. Taiwan sometimes is said to hold two features there. This is likely to be inferred from reports of Taiwan erecting structures (in 1995 and 2004) and its officials landing (in 2003 and 2012) on Ban Than Reef. However, the best description of Ban Than’s current status is “unoccupied.” Ban Than has a beach less than 100 meters long, which lies about 2.5 nm from Itu Aba and about 4 nm from the Vietnamese-occupied Sand Cay. The Pentagon identifies no outpost on Ban Than, and no structures are visible in recent satellite images as well as photos of the reef. Sources with local knowledge told me that both Taiwanese and Vietnamese troops have occasionally planted materials on Ban Than and used them as targets for their live-fire exercises.

China

In the Spratly Islands, China has occupied six features since 1988 and Mischief Reef since 1995. The seven features occupied by China in the Spratly Islands are:

Subi Reef (Chinese: 渚碧礁 Zhubi Jiao),
Gaven Reef (南薰礁 Nanxun Jiao),
Hughes Reef (东门礁 Dongmen Jiao),
Johnson South Reef (赤瓜礁 Chigua Jiao),
Fiery Cross Reef (永暑礁 Yongshu Jiao),
Cuarteron Reef (华阳礁 Huayang Jiao),
Mischief Reef (美济礁 Meiji Jiao).

When the Pentagon in May 2015 said there were eight Chinese outposts in the Spratly Islands, some thought that the eighth was Eldad Reef. But the APMSS map released three months later shows two outposts on Mischief alone, and none on Eldad. This is a fact that has often been missed

The mistaken status of Eldad, Whitsun, and Ladd Reefs is likely to have been inferred from reports about Vietnam protesting against Chinese troops landing on Eldad Reef in 1990, Da Ba Dau in March 1992 and Da Lac in July 1992

Several stories in the Vietnamese social media suggest that Eldad, Whitsun, and McKennan are frequently sites of quiet cat-and-mouse games between China and Vietnam, one attempting to get a foothold on these ‘new islands’ while the other tries to frustrate these efforts

Malaysia

As with the case of the Philippines, the number of Malaysian-held features in the Spratlys varies depending on how one defines occupation. Most accounts typically speak of either five or eight features. Malaysia has troops and facilities stationed on five features:

Swallow Reef (Malay: Layang-Layang), since 1983,
Ardasier Reef (Ubi), since 1986,
Mariveles Reef (Mantanani), since 1986,
Erica Reef (Siput), since 1999,
Investigator Shoal (Peninjau), since 1999

Several sources also list three more features, including Dallas Reef (Laya), Royal Charlotte Reef (Semarang Barat Besar), and Louisa Reef (Semarang Barat Kecil), as occupied by Malaysia. However, more recent, reliable, and knowledgeable sources from Malaysia, Brunei, and the United States confirm that there are in fact no troops stationed on these three features

Malaysia appears to “occupy” Dallas Reef in a similar way to how the Philippines did with Flat Island. Troops from nearby Ardasier Reef, which lies about 3 nm from Dallas Reef, may watch and visit the latter on a regular basis. Royal Charlotte and Louisa Reefs, on the other hand, can hardly be classified as “occupied.” While there is a beacon on Royal Charlotte, visitors report that it was inactive and there were no others structures on the reef. Visitors have also found Louisa deserted with no other structures than an obelisk-shaped beacon, which was also not working. Among these eight features, Swallow, Mariveles, Erica, Royal Charlotte, and Louisa Reefs reportedly have some natural portions protruding above high tide, while Ardasier, Dallas, and Investigator are likely low-tide elevations. The beacons on Royal Charlotte and Louisa might have been built by Malaysia in the 1980s as a means to assert sovereignty over the two reefs

Brunei

The only feature in the Spratly Islands that is claimed by Brunei is Louisa Reef. According to official statements by Malaysia and Brunei, an Exchange of Letters signed in 2009 has “established the final delimitation of territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone” between the two countries. The agreement unequivocally states that Brunei has sovereignty over two oil blocks within which Louisa Reef is located.

Although Malaysia has not officially dropped its territorial claims over this feature, the agreement with Brunei substantially weakens Malaysia’s claims. As both Malaysia and Brunei have grounded their sovereignty claims over Louisa on the basis of coastal state rights, Malaysia’s acknowledgement of Brunei’s territorial sea, continental shelf, and EEZ is tantamount to effectively conceding Louisa Reef to Brunei. However, this appears to be a tacit understanding rather than an official agreement of any kind. The Exchange of Letters has yet to be publicized, and even if it would be made public, there would likely be no mentioning of Louisa. This is certainly the case with Limbang District, the other territorial dispute between Brunei and Malaysia.

keep that finger cross that no deal will be make at least 2-3 year from now

keep that finger cross that no deal will be make at least 2-3 year from now

yeah, even possible up to 5-7 year from now. 

Finally.Been hoping for joint patrol for quite a while.

Emergency crews in New Hanover County responded to a military jet that crashed off Wrightsville Beach Friday evening.

According to dispatch, the crash was first reported around 4:45 p.m. near the 1700 block of North Lumina Avenue.

Wrightsville Beach Police Chief Daniel House said a pilot ejected out of a Harrier jet, which eventually crashed into the water. The pilot had departed the Wilmington International Airport and was conducting flight training with the intention of returning to the airport.

Two members of the Wrightsville Beach Ocean Rescue, Kyle Miess and Jeremy Owens, were first on scene in a jet ski and were prepared to take him to shore.

The pilot was upright in the chair that he ejected with when they arrived and was cold and alert. He had a flotation device that allowed him to sit out of the water and he only suffered a few bruises.

Report of the Indonesian (Pindad) - Turkish (FNSS) Medium Tank prototypes scheduled to be completed and unveil to the public in 2017. The Pindad-FNSS Medium Tank weight will be around 25-30 tons and can be equipped upon request with 105mm or 120mm gun.

Model of the Pindad Medium Tank (photo by Defense Studies):



http://ekbis.sindonews.com/read/1106473/34...juta-1462457476

Kurdish news network Rudaw interviews Peshmerga fighters who were involved in the battle in which U.S. Navy SEAL Charlie Keating was killed in northern Iraq. The indigenous fighters tell of the courageousness and impressive fighting skill of the elite American warriors, giving us a little more insight into what happened that day. Interestingly, one of the Peshmerga explains how a British advisor was shot in the head. It’s entirely possible he was referring to Keating, as no other reports have indicated a U.K. death in the incident, but further clarification is needed

Report of the Indonesian (Pindad) - Turkish (FNSS) Medium Tank prototypes scheduled to be completed and unveil to the public in 2017. The Pindad-FNSS Medium Tank weight will be around 25-30 tons and can be equipped upon request with 105mm or 120mm gun.

Model of the Pindad Medium Tank (photo by Defense Studies):



http://ekbis.sindonews.com/read/1106473/34...juta-1462457476

feel very unusual for Heli incident in sarawak, the debris separated so wide, maybe river water carry to very far.

Maybe  mid air explosion?

engine in front

learning from Merkava i see

the victim were found in charred condition
so maybe

Australia’s Submarine Superiority: Strange Strategies and Overspending

How grounded in strategic reality is the Australian government’s decision to purchase 12 new submarines?

By Greg Austin
May 06, 2016
 
On April 25 2016, the very day that Australia commemorated its war dead who fell in Europe a century earlier, Australia sent a private note to France, its former ally, that it had won the bidding process to be preferred designer of 12 new submarines.

In announcing the decision, the Australian government made some understandable historical allusions to past alliances but it also delivered a series of all too glib one-liners about the country’s future strategic needs and unnamed potential adversaries.

The prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull, described the future boats from France’s DCNS (the “Shortfin” Barracuda-class) as “regionally superior submarines” and said that during their build they will be “the most sophisticated naval vessels being built in the world.”

Turnbull said later that day that “we have a sovereign defense force and we should have a sovereign defense industry with construction here, wherever possible in Australia.” He qualified this by acknowledging that for “any product of advanced manufacturing in the 21st century, there is a global supply chain and there will be elements components that are built in the United States or supplied from France.”

This A$50 billion ($38.8 billion) project is supposed to be part of the country’s push to become an innovation nation, but the government has not provided much detail on just how the project will drive innovation in Australia. Turnbull, when pressed, has been unable to specify just how much of the project would be Australian-built, beyond suggesting that all the submarines would be built here and that the project would create 2,800 new jobs.

There are some warning lights going off in my mind about the strategic thinking behind the decision to build 12 submarines rather than six or eight, and the government’s rhetoric justifying it.

Given Australia’s relatively benign strategic environment, the very high projected cost for the 12 Shortfin Barracuda boats is probably not justified, especially since the primary practical missions of the submarine fleet will be covert operations and intelligence collection.

The Defense White Paper 2016 says that the submarine fleet’s missions will be “anti‐submarine warfare; anti‐surface vessel warfare; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and support to special operations.” But the first two of these missions are credible contingencies only in a small number of quite unlikely circumstances, and then mostly as part of a multinational force with the United States where our commitment would not need to exceed three submarines at any time.

Turnbull said that the 12 new submarines are being built to “defend our island nation.” One might well ask who is threatening the Australian continent now or into the future in such way that this submarine force would become a decisive factor. In the unlikely event that there were to be a military conflict near our shores, it is not likely to last long enough for the Australian submarines to be a decisive capability.

In launching the 2016 Defense White Paper on February 25, 2016, the prime minister deployed several empty phrases, such as needing regional deterrence and shifting strategic balances, without any detailed account of just what these terms might mean in 15-30 years’ time. No substantive detail has been forthcoming from the Defense Department.

After the submarine decision, Turnbull has replayed the rather obvious proposition that “in the next two decades, half the world’s submarines and at least half the world’s advanced combat aircraft will be operating in the Indo-Pacific region, in our region.” Since that region comprises more than half the world in population, and is home to littoral countries delivering somewhere close to two-thirds of global GDP, we might reasonably ask just how many submarines and combat aircraft we might otherwise expect the region to have.

In this context, Turnbull’s emphasis on Australia’s “regionally superior submarines” is equally curious, given that by the time they are built and in service (beginning 2030), other regional countries, such as Indonesia, on track to become far more wealthy than it is today, could have acquired the same or better simply by buying newer advanced boats from France. DCNS currently supplies Malaysia with a different, lower grade submarine (Scorpène-class) and there are reports from 2015 that Indonesia is interested in buying the Scorpène-class submarine as well. But thankfully, Indonesia (more of a maritime state than Australia) does not yet see acquisition of naval power as of such overriding importance relative to national economic development as Australia appears to.

True, the Project 885 Yasen class is impressive. Armed with cruise, antiship and anti-submarine missiles, the highly autonomous nuclear-powered multipurpose attack submarine is a force to be reckoned with. It is fast, silent and deep-diving.

Thanks to its unique features, the Yasen class "came as an unpleasant surprise to the United States," Lukanin observed. "Americans are concerned that our silent subs could largely neutralize [Washington's] ballistic missile defense system."