their elaun misi (paid by UN) can easily reach rm5k per soldiers
thats not even counting their own basic pay plus other elaun (harian, pakar, cuti)

Deployment paid is 1Xk and paid in USD
tu berebut tawar diri nak pergi Lebanon
tak masuk yang beli barang buat business kat Malaysia balik

I got 1 sweet knife from there given to me by my friend.
Israel steel yo

I really dunno mah

Have only read in Western news article that exact description: "few Usd per head per day"

DDG so the soldiers get Rm5k per month? then surely the gross pay from UN to Msia is a lot more than that!

Even the Tanzanian get more than "few Usd per head per day"from the UN
if from their government maybe.

To Westerners 1k usd is low maybe

But its not like their soldiers are paid very highly either

Most probably....
There was talk/speculation in the past that we may use that money to buy our neighbor made 6x6 APC to be sent to Lebonan...32 units for USD 80 mil... Last2,we just sent our 'recond' Condors..

we may 'songlaped' the money a little bit

This post has been edited by patt_sue: Dec 23 2017, 11:34 PM

Er no, 500-1000 USD per month non taxable is more or less the standard rate for the US army,alongside basic pay
How can Songlap when you need to buy it first before being reimbursed by the UN? K-200 MIFVs were paid by the UN,after the mission ended

The Indonesian Anoas were pieces of shit,same as the condor rustbuckets

This post has been edited by heavyduty: Dec 24 2017, 12:04 AM

its a tongue in cheek comment.. dont take it seriously..

For UN missions?

Yeah but in relation to their cost of living? Its like... us getting Rm1k and Viets getting Rm1k and Singkie getting Rm1k is 3 very different things, know what I mean?

africans? south asians you mean...

good for lowly paid soldiers... but at the same time these soldiers spread diseases and their bad habits when they are deployed too...

it is common that developed countries are reluctant to send as the compensations are not viable

still buying new APCs for Malbatt

http://www.malaysiandefence.com/rise-of-the-guardians/

We never have any intention to "buy" any neighbor made 6x6 at the first place
Sembang kencang anoa ni, same during DSA2012 the agent there said Malaysia already deal for 6x6 and now already signed la, itu la last2 habuk pun tarak.

Four Key Geopolitical Trends for 2018

Royal Thai Army New Norinco VT4 MBT.



http://thaidefense-news.blogspot.co.id/201...t-3000.html?m=1

New locally made P2 Commando Armored Vehicles for the Indonesian Presidential Guards (Paspampres) built by PT Sentra Surya Ekajaya. Credit to original uploader.

New CN235-220 MPA for the Indonesian Navy Aviation during flight test at PTDI facility. The new MPA configuration is different from the previous Indonesian Navy MPA with the FLIR positioned below the nose of the aircraft. Credit to Bimo.



https://www.instagram.com/p/BdB6iTDh0Ay/

This post has been edited by azriel: Dec 25 2017, 08:30 AM

Why It's Impossible to Sink This $13 Billion Ship

1/4 of the video is freaking WoW advert

Why are Israeli Officers so Unprofessional?

Why are Israeli Officers so Unprofessional?
Research · March 2016
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.3664.8082
Tamir Libel at Institut Barcelona d´Estudis Internacionals
Tamir Libel

Abstract

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.3664.8082 ·Available from: Tamir Libel, Mar 23, 2016

Why are Israeli Officers so Unprofessional? Tamir Libel Haaretz, 16/2/2016. Available at: http://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.2853241 Imagine receiving a telephone call late at night. The police officer on the line informs you that your child was involved in a car accident. You race to the hospital, and are greeted by an impressive-looking physician. Although young, he is brimming with self-confidence, and tells you precisely what you need to do. No doubt you'd follow his instructions, right? You ask him in passing where he studied medicine. To your astonishment he replies: "Oh, I'm not a doctor, just a paramedic". Such a scenario is certainly unrealistic in an Israeli hospital setting, but recurs time and again whenever the Israeli government convenes for a security meeting and is debriefed by senior officers of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The IDF, richly equipped with cutting edge technology, fails to provide its officers with the education they require to perform their duties. It may refuse to acknowledge this fact, but being an officer is a profession, and officers across the western world are acquiring military education that prepares them for heading units in routine times, and planning and executing military operations in times of emergency. A military education does not necessarily prevent mistakes, but it does furnish officers with the knowledge and skills to cope with situations they have yet to personally experience on the ground.

The military education system is comprised of several levels. Just as a medical doctor studies pre-clinical subjects for four years, so the American officer gains knowledge in history, social sciences, exact sciences and even engineering at West Point. These subjects form the basis of the military education this officer would receive at the Command and Staff College as a major, which, in turn, will serve as basis for the strategic education acquired at the War College. What Israeli officers learn in the officer training course offered by the IDF School of Officers at Training Base 1 (Bahad 1) does not compare with the content provided by the West Point education programme, but rather with that offered by the US Army's non-commissioned officer (NCO) academies. And indeed, Bahad 1 graduates function not as officers in the western sense of the word, but as mediocre and inexperienced non-commissioned officers. In western armies, officers are free to command as soon as they are qualified, since the famous sergeant is the one tasked with "mothering" the troops. Such professional soldiers also form the backbone of Western field units. By contrast, when Israeli officers attend the officially named the Joint Course at the Command and Staff College known as PUM, in the best case scenario they actively receive the specific knowledge needed in their military branch, which they should really have acquired much earlier. Their German or British counterparts, meanwhile, are undergoing a true joint course, thanks to their military school education, in addition to the branch-specific staff and command courses taken while they were captains. Similarly, the teaching faculty, education programme quality and, physical infrastructure at IDF colleges lag far behind those common in Europe and the US.

Now all of the above has certain implications. First, IDF officers do not study nor practice staff work, as manifest by dysfunctional headquarters the likes of which were seen during the Second Lebanon War, but also by the daily haphazard management with which every reserve soldier is familiar. Second, Israeli officers do not study professional military theory and practice, and therefore only excel at what they have learned to do from personal experience. Thus, the officers that performed well during the second Intifada attempted to replicate their successes in the Occupied Territories during the Second Lebanon War. Third, IDF officers at the highest ranks lack the knowledge and thinking skills required to understand security issues in the broader sense. The IDF conduct during the planning and execution of the raid on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara raid, which tried to break the blockade on Gaza strip, is one example of what might happen as a result. A window of change was opened by the decision to relocate the military colleges from their current Glilot site, marking a historical opportunity to close down both the Command and General Staff College and the National Security College and set up Israel's first true military college. The new institution would be academically accredited, and offer the courses currently provided by both the Command and General Staff College and the National Security College. The academic accreditation would ensure a high level of teaching faculty, and, as is common in western world armies, the latter would include leading officers as well as PhD scholars. Such a combination would also allow the college to serve as a center for security and military studies, which to date has yet to be established in Israel, despite being home to many institutes for strategic studies.

In the long term the college should also include a joint military academy, offering three- and four-year study programmes that form a prerequisite for permanent service. If any top ranking IDF official should call Washington or London and seek advice from the experienced, they would certainly be coming to the right place. In recent years the Pentagon helped set up a joint command and staff college for the Saudi army, and the British are promoting similar reforms in the Gulf emirates. The sea may be the same, but Arab officers could potentially outsmart their Israeli counterparts in the not-too-distant future. Dr. Libel is a research fellow at the Barcelona Institute of International Relations (IBEI)

the video is more like "i got this amount of $$$$ in term of air craft, missile etc, that why i am invincible to be sinked"

if like similar logic, kirov class have even more weapon