QUOTE(UFO-ET @ May 16 2014, 06:12 PM)
Yr greatest "Strength" is Copy & Paste
Yr greatest "Weaknesses" is Paste & Copy
Are you a photostatting boy in a stationary shop?

Lu copy pun taklak, Paste pun taklak, in fact apa pun taklak,
Only cakap kosong & wish everyone below you.
Better don't tell u my occupation or else u fell depress about your good self.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/629f5c40-d98e-11...l#axzz31sCKuabnChina property downturn would be painful but salutaryIf financial Armageddon were visited upon China, the country’s banks would emerge from the rubble with little more than light bruises. That, at least, was the conclusion of a recent stress test conducted by the central bank.
In the very worst case, the People’s Bank of China envisaged bad loans quintupling in a flash. But it found that, even amid such carnage, banks would retain capital buffers equivalent to 10.5 per cent of their assets – a comfortable margin of safety. “Our country’s banking system has a strong ability to withstand economic shocks,” it said.
Investors were not exactly persuaded, though. Chinese bank stocks have continued to drift downwards since late April, when the stress test results were published. Listed banks have price-to-book ratios below 1, implying that investors believe their assets are worth less than their stated value – a remarkable situation when the banks are still reporting double-digit profit growth.
More than anything, this chasm between regulators and investors stems from divergent views of the banks’ vulnerability to a housing downturn. With Chinese real estate starting to look shaky as transactions decline, a longstanding theoretical debate is becoming more real.
The official stress test will prove far too optimistic. Chinese banks are not going to collapse, but the defences built around them are flimsier than Beijing thinks.
Regulators have been fond of making two arguments – both of which will be found wanting in a downturn. One is the apparently limited exposure of China’s banks to property. Direct lending by banks to property-related companies is just about a quarter of their balance sheets – significant but hardly overwhelming. For Chinese banks listed in Hong Kong, 17 per cent of their total loans are mortgages, 6 per cent are loans to developers and 3 per cent go to construction firms, according to Credit Suisse.
But a focus on direct lending alone is misleading. Non-standard credit products – including investments funnelled via shadow banks – form 5-20 per cent of Chinese banks’ assets, many of which are tied to property. On-balance-sheet loans classified as corporate debt are also linked to the property market, as state-owned enterprises from railway builders to shipping companies have big real estate arms and use ordinary bank loans to invest in them.
The second argument trumpeted by regulators is the lack of leverage in the Chinese property market. Homebuyers are required to make downpayments of at least 30 per cent to obtain mortgages and banks typically value homes at about four-fifths of their sale price. Lu Linyong, chief executive of Zhongding Property Appraisal, notes that this would thus require house prices to fall 44 per cent before mortgage holders were in negative equity. China is clearly a world apart from the US before the subprime crisis.
A fall in property prices would lead to a decline in collateral value that would force banks to increase provisioning, and rein in lending. Companies would be able to borrow less and investment would fall – causing a further fall in property prices
But leverage is still seeping into the system. Property developers, desperate for sales, have started promotions in which they cover two-thirds of mortgage downpayments – meaning buyers are paying just 10 per cent up front. Buyers are also drawing on credit from other sources, including consumer finance.
A more systemic concern about leverage is the way in which property and land have underpinned the rise in debt throughout the Chinese financial system.
Mortgages form the collateral for about 40 per cent of bank loans. A further 10 per cent of loans are backed by land. As Nicholas Borst of the Peterson Institute for International Economics argues, this could make for an ugly downward spiral: a fall in property prices would lead to a decline in collateral value that would force banks to increase provisioning, and rein in lending. Companies would be able to borrow less and investment would fall – causing a further fall in property prices, and so on.
There are other ways in which a housing correction could hit the banking sector. Land sales account for nearly half of local government revenues. These will suffer in a property downturn, thus crimping fiscal spending. Property is also the dominant savings asset for households. Falling housing values will therefore weigh on consumption.
But in one important respect, a property downturn would be a welcome development for Chinese banks. Economies are never static, and that is especially true of one such as China’s that has barely reached middle-income status. The degree to which the Chinese economy has become reliant on property is distressing but it cannot remain this way forever. The sooner it ends, the sooner China’s banks will be able to find a more balanced recipe for future growth.
Simon Rabinovitch is the Financial Times’ Shanghai correspondent