coupled with its high-profile flight and relatively slow speed i think even a standard 30mm rcws cannon can defeat it..


https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/wor...pike-design.htm

Issue is accuracy probably

Spike ER naval is not wire-guided surely?!

you can barely see the fiber optic wires early in the video

So for an anti-ship missile, it doesn't do what an antiship missile supposed to do?
Ain't fast nor does it has sea skimming ability?

not sink also 

oh keep it for next exercises 

Sub ops....in ASuW... sub will attack high value unit (log ship, aircraft carrier etc) with torpedo to sink it....and the escorts (DDG, FFG etc) with missile just to paralyse it

We cant aim where to hit for exocet, it will aim itself where to hit...depending on the target  acquired...the final manouvre before hitting

Ok Poseidon tu naik balik nama dia pasal no 1, salesman talk
terutama bila Boeing tau yang Malaysia have huge cash tu splurge from MMRCA punya budget

Aku juga prefer poseidon/neptune sebenarnya pasal it is a complete package
Norway beli 5 Poseidon for USD1.2 billion flyaway cost
since ini US, tak payah risau la pasal songlap pasal semua ledger accessible from congress

oh so Singapore la you!
jk jk 

arab pilots.. 

just put on throttle and throw flares..
no attempt for evasive maneuver?

Arabs + anything = trash.
Have you learnt nothing from the Israeli-Arab wars

looks like towed decoy is the latest decoy tech nowadays
seems the europeans is way ahead of their americans bros in this department

Security system of the Russian Khmeimim air base and Russian Naval CSS point in the city of Tartus successfully warded off a terrorist attack with massive application of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) through the night of 5th – 6th January, 2018.

As evening fell, the Russia air defence forces detected 13 unidentified small-size air targets at a significant distance approaching the Russian military bases.

Ten assault drones were approaching the Khmeimim air base, and another three – the CSS point in Tartus.

Six small-size air targets were intercepted and taken under control by the Russian EW units. Three of them were landed on the controlled area outside the base, and another three UAVs exploded as they touched the ground.

Seven UAVs were eliminated by the Pantsir-S anti-aircraft missile complexes operated by the Russian air defence units on 24-hours alert.

The Russian bases did not suffer any casualties or damages.

The Khmeimim air base and Russian Naval CSS point in Tartus are functioning on a scheduled basis.

Currently, the Russian military experts are analyzing the construction, technical filling and improvised explosives of the captured UAVs.

Having decoded the data recorded on the UAVs, the specialists found out the launch site.

It was the first time when terrorists applied a massed drone aircraft attack launched at a range of more than 50 km using modern GPS guidance system. Technical examination of the drones showed that such attacks could have been made by terrorists at a distance of about 100 kilometers.

Engineering decisions applied by terrorists while attacks on the Russian objects in Syria could be received from one of countries with high-technological capabilities of satellite navigation and remote dropping control of professionally assembled improvised explosive devices in assigned coordinates. All drones of terrorists are fitted with pressure transducers and altitude control servo-actuators.

Terrorists’ aircraft-type drones carried explosive devices with foreign detonating fuses.

The Russian specialists are determining supply channels, through which terrorists had received the technologies and devices, as well as examining type and origin of explosive compounds used in the IEDs.

The fact of usage of strike aircraft-type drones by terrorists is the evidence that militants have received technologies to carry out terrorist attacks using such UAVs in any country."

The Russian Ministry of Defense has acknowledged an attack on its Khmeimim air base in Syria, but has disputed key details from an initial report, denying that seven aircraft had been destroyed in the incident. At the same time, unconfirmed pictures have begun emerging on social media showing significant damage to at least one Su-24 Fencer attack plane.

On Jan. 4, 2017, the Russia’s Ministry of Defense, by way of state-run media outlet TASS, said militants had attacked Khmeimim, also known as Hmeimim or Hmeymim, and killed two Russian service members in the process. The Kremlin did not say if there were any other casualties, but insisted that earlier reports that the assault had destroyed seven aircraft were categorically false. On Jan. 3, 2017, independent Russian daily Kommersant had reported this detail and that the enemy force had wounded 10 individuals, citing unnamed diplomatic sources.

"On December 31, 2017, at nightfall, the Hmeymim airfield came under a sudden mortar fire from a mobile militant subversive group,” the Russian Ministry of Defense said, according to TASS. “A report in the Kommersant newspaper on the alleged destruction of seven Russian warplanes at the Hmeymim airbase is fake. Russia’s air group in Syria is combat ready and continues to accomplish all its missions in full.”

It is important to note that this denial does not say militants were not successful in destroying any aircraft, just that the report of seven aircraft destroyed in total is inaccurate. And the reported loss of aircraft would hardly render the Russian air contingent in Syria combat ineffective.

According to Kommersant, militants had destroyed four Su-24 Fencer attack planes, two Su-35S fighter jets, and an An-72 tactical transport. Past satellite imagery has shown as many as six Su-35s and nearly a dozen Su-24s, along with a variety of other fighter and ground attack aircraft, such as the very active Su-25 Frogfoots, on the ground at the base.

Koh Swee Lean Collin is a research fellow with the maritime security programme at the Nanyang Technological University's S Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
Read more at https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapa...-t-be-a-9867212

Two most likely

Pakistan or thailand. The later have better chance

Indonesian Navy Power Projection By 2023.

For those actually interested to learn about Malaysian military policies and doctrines, can refer to this policy paper released by MINDEF:

Malaysia's National Defence Policy

Quite interesting read.