I would like to make an assessment of the momentarily situation around Avdiivka.
Russians made a range of huge mistakes, but I would like to start with things which they did right. The first was to apparently conceal their built up in this sector. It is only fair to say that the intensity of the Russian attack in the sector surprised the Ukrainian defense. The Russian army successfully deployed a strike force which comprises a forces the size of several brigades. To conceal such a large offensive force is a feat in itself and I will give them that. The second feat is to muster logistically such an attack, though there is something which already nullifies this feat, but I will dive into this later.
And here it ends what they did right.
Despite early success of the Russian attackers primarily around Krasnohorivka (Screenshot 1) and thanks to their clandestine built up in this sector, Russian forces showed almost instantly their weaknesses, especially when it comes to mobile warfare. You cannot describe it differently than they utterly suck here. This has been a constant in Russian warfare since February 24, 2022, and it is mind boggling how little they learned ever since. There were
several videos showing large convoys of Russian vehicles trying to squeeze themselves through roads which in the end were basically chokepoints. Especially their strike force from Krasnohorivka, which made few hundred meters progress, showed this development (Screenshot 1). You could observe that Russian tanks were trying to bypass the leading vehicles which likely were stopped by mines or Ukrainian ATGM and drone teams, which btw. fought valiantly.
In fact, those Ukrainian ATGMs and drone teams made the difference and stopped the Russian onslaught in the tracks. This was also likely the moment when the Russian and way too optimistic plans went sideways. We saw countless of Russian vehicles, most of the time the leading vehicles of the convoy, being knocked out, only to observe Russian vehicles trying to bypass them and mindlessly rushing through the fields. The result can been seen in the post I sent yesterday showing the Russian tank which hit TM-62 mines in open field. I'm fully aware that the visibility of T-Series tanks is weak, but running over such a defense line, which certainly was known before the attack was launched and which should be relayed to all offensive units before, only emphasizes the little combat quality the average Russian soldiers brings. It is true that the Russian High Command consciously sacrifices troops for land, which was especially witnessed in Bakhmut and where the win-loss ratio of up to 1:10 was acceptable, but this is not a tenable strategy. This can be also witnessed in Bakhmut where ever since the Russian army found herself in a defending position and losing ground, gradually.
What is the highest blunder of the Russian offensive is the fact that it is strategically seen totally useless. Even when we project that they would take Avdiivka, which is a very big If and after this week more than questionable, it is - even when projected the most optimistic outcome - a huge waste of resource. In my opinion it is even far worse than Vuhledar and Bakhmut because it completely ignores the situation in Zaporizhzhia. We have seen along the southern frontline a huge uptick of Russian losses, especially in terms of artillery. Aside from a range of other objectives, it is obvious that
Ukrainian forces methodically degrade Russian artillery capabilities. This comes along with a visible drop of Russian artillery fire, though I assess this is increasingly related to the huge wear of the artillery barrels and less due to ammunition shortages, which however are also an issue since Ukraine methodically destroys logistics hubs.
In an atmosphere like this one might assume that Russia would rather chose to further invest in an effective and "elastic" defense and allocate resource to deny Ukrainians to further advance or just degrade the Russian defense in Zaporizhzhia, something which Russian General Ivan Popov was demanding shortly before he got discharged by the Russian Defense Ministry. Instead, this stunt around Avdiivka gets approved and ends as other Russian offensives ended, in utter disaster. It shows that Putin does not reward competence. He only rewards loyalty.
You cannot even say that this Russian offensive around Avdiivka would further bind Ukrainian reserves because Avdiivka has always been a fortress which Ukrainians can defend with a relative minimum of soldiers. In fact, thanks to the Russian offensive in this sector, Avdiivka has become an integral part of the Ukrainian counteroffensive because it binds huge Russian reserves, and the longer the Russian army tries to take the city the better for the Ukrainian war effort in the long run.
Even though we cannot entirely assess the Russian losses in the Avdiivka sector, then it still safe to say that they are extraordinarily high and that Russia clearly squandered a huge amount of resources around Avdiivka. It is a strategic blunder because it wouldn't have changed the strategic situation even if Avdiivka would have been taken by Russia. Instead, vital resources needed for the upcoming winter and next year are gone forever. The whole Russian operation reminds me of the German WW2 offensive in the Ardennes in 1944 which is commonly known as the "Battle of the Bulge". Just like in the Ardennes, German forces surprised the Allies and made tangible gains, but were bogged down against fortified Allied positions, such as in Bastogne, and were mired in long traffic jams. In the end, Germany squandered her last elite forces and wasted resources which were much more needed for the defense.
The question - why Russia launched this offensive in the first place - is justified and I speculate that those are primarily of propagandistic and to a certain extent narcissistic nature. Ever since Wagner's announcement of taking Bakhmut the Russian Ministry of Defense and in particular Shoigu and Gerassimov have been yearning to present something similar to the Russian people. Avdiivka is at the gates of Donetsk and has always been a painful thorn for Russia in this sector. Taking the city even when it would mean to lose countless of resource - similar to Bakhmut - is sometimes more preferable than a (perceived) stalemate. I believe Avdiivka has been selected for this very reason by them.
Russians never get tired to claim that the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia is a "failure". This derives from the fact that on the map you do not see many changes, even though the dynamics are huge, just as the Russian losses. But nothing could be more wrong and can get proven statistically as mentioned in the artillery ratio and the fact that Russian artillery systems are getting destroyed in huge numbers. But those strategically important points cannot easily been converted into propagandistic talking points. The public and even the press loves maps and arrows on them and if they lack they draw their own and in most cases wrong conclusions. The Russian leadership thought that if some Russian arrows on the map appear after weeks of perceived stalemate, it would yield in some propaganda points which would be picked up by the press and further increasing political pressure on the Ukrainian leadership. Taking the heating up crisis in Israel and Gaza into account, this might get even more traction.
In the end, I assess that the Russian Avdiivka offensive reflects everything what is wrong in Russia's way to wage war in Ukraine. It is strategically seen a blunder and in the long run will certainly have a negative impact in Russia's war effort, whether they take or take not Avdiivka. It also shows the absolute difference in how Ukraine wages war. In the first weeks Ukraine's counteroffensive,
AFU tried to storm the Zaporizhzhia front similar to how Russia storms Avdiivka, though at to no time to the same extent and volume as Russia. Ukrainian forces have drawn the right conclusions, stopped it, changed tactics and started to degrade Russia in a way how to degrade an entrenched enemy. This is not a spectacular way, but an effective one. It will bring the desired results when it continues this way and, more importantly, it will be persistent.
Ukraine has something what Russia does not have and this is a coherent war strategy. In the end, this will be the most important reason why Ukraine will win this war.
https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/1713520368151941558 
Oct 15 2023, 04:58 PM
, Marchenko told the meetings earlier this week, and sufficient gas storage for the winter should buttress the economy from a potential rise in prices, he told Reuters.
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