In April 2016, the U.S. Air Force deployed four A-10 Warthog attack jets to The Philippines for patrols over the South China Sea

The low- and slow-flying A-10 — the Air Force’s premier tank-killer — might seem like an odd choice for a maritime patrol plane, especially in air space where there’s a good chance of running into supersonic Chinese fighters

But the radar-less A-10 is capable of fighting at sea, provided some other plane does the sensor work. Warthogs gunned enemy patrol boats during the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. And 27 years earlier in 1984, the late novelist Tom Clancy described A-10s taking on the Soviet navy in his classic technothriller The Hunt for Red October

The Americans intend to send a message — back off. A hundred Air Force fighters fly toward Kirov, seeming to the battlecruiser’s radar operators like an “alpha strike,”

Armed with a full load of depleted-uranium ammunition for their 30-millimeter cannons plus underwing Rockeye cluster bombs, the Warthogs of Linebacker flight fly just 100 feet above the waves in order to stay off Kirov’s radar screens, their part-time pilots observing radio silence to complete their stealthy profiles

According to an article published on China.com, a site that appears to be ultimately owned by the Chinese government, the People’s Liberation Army is looking at using smokescreens to protect against lasers. Smoke on battlefields is usually a tool of concealment, not armor. When it comes to lasers, the simple physics of light means smoke has serious potential as armor.

Last summer, Subrata Ghoshroy of MIT’s Science, Technology and Global Security Working Group wrote in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists:

Any weapon that relies upon light traveling through the atmosphere runs into the problems of dust, humidity, and fog—features which absorb and scatter the laser energy. In addition, atmospheric distortions such as turbulence can deflect a beam of light. And at the same time that the photons in a laser’s beam must overcome all of these obstacles, they must also stay focused in a tight column and keep advancing forward without diminishing in power. Meanwhile, the user of the laser weapon must account for the movement of the target, the movement of the firing platform, and any decoys, dummies, or multiple war warheads that the enemy throws up.

Lasers as we know them only work in certain weather. This is a problem that can be overcome; before bullet casings became standard, rain could ruin gunpowder and leave riflemen holding strange, ineffective sticks. The bullet casing solution took centuries, and while it’s likely lasers will outwit smoke in less time than that, putting up a smokescreen is a cheap, effective answer to weapons right now. So China’s army is looking into quick ways to put smoke up where they need it. From Popular Mechanics:

The PLA is experimenting with creating smoke in two ways: creating sulfur trioxide smoke through burning materials (spraying oil on a hot diesel engine is one way to do it) or creating an oily fog. The PLA Chemical Corps plans to use a new multiple canister launcher (pictured) to rapidly lay down protective smoke screens for nearby friendly forces.

If smoke beats lasers, and for a few years it certainly might, there’s an even older force that can completely undermine smoke: wind. As futuristic as modern war is, weather still gets a say.

A new drone-captured video on YouTube shows off the South Korea's new main battle tank, offering spectacular aerial views of the K-2 "Black Panther" in the field, complete with firing smoke dischargers and wading a river

Although development was completed in 2007, problems with the transmission and engine delayed production. The problem was temporarily solved by sourcing German power packs for the first 100 vehicles, to be replaced with a Korean-made power pack for subsequent production models

The first K-2s entered service in 2014 Roughly four hundred tanks will be built, replacing South Korea's obsolete M48 Patton tanks

The K-2 is roughly comparable to the French LeClerc and the American M1 Abrams. It has the same German-designed 120-millimeter main gun as the Abrams, but with a longer barrel to boost projectile velocity

It reportedly can feed the gun one round every three seconds. The K-2 has a radar autotracker, allowing the main gun to lock onto and follow a moving enemy tank or low-flying aircraft

Another standout capability of the K-2 lies in the Korean Standoff Top Attack Munition (KSTAM) munition. KSTAM is fired from the main gun at long range and, like artillery, can attack targets beyond the line of sight. After it's shot into a target area, KSTAM deploys a parachute and turns on its sensor package, including a millimetric wave radar and infra-red sensor

Once it detects a target, it fires an explosively forged penetrator into the enemy's thin top armor. A weapon system like KSTAM is particularly useful in South Korea's mountainous terrain

The K-2 is smaller than many tanks, weighing a trim 55 tons. It has a peppy horsepower to weight (ton) ratio of 27.2, approximately 20 percent better than a late model Abrams tank

A weapon system like KSTAM is particularly useful in South Korea's mountainous terrain

The K-2 is smaller than many tanks, weighing a trim 55 tons. It has a peppy horsepower to weight (ton) ratio of 27.2, approximately 20 percent better than a late model Abrams tank

The tank's hydropneumatic suspension system can lower its profile by 16 inches, making it less vulnerable to enemy fire

China is sending some of its most advanced naval assets to the South China Sea for a scheduled exercise this month. Those include a new guided missile destroyer.

The exercise will be focusing on anti-missile warfare and other tasks, Xinhua news agency reported on Wednesday. It added that among the ships sent were missile destroyer Hefei, missile frigate Sanya and supply ship Honghu along with missile destroyers Lanzhou and Guangzhou, and missile frigate Yuli, which are currently tasked with other duties.

The following map from Parag Khanna’s book “Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization” demonstrates exactly why the Arctic will become the world’s next major frontier.

Largely, the competition in the Arctic will be based off of overlapping territorial claims and the region’s high likelihood of having major oil and gas fields:

By 2030, the WSJ notes, the Northern Sea Route will be passable to shipping for nine months a year.

Russia, Denmark, Norway, Canada, and the US all have partial claims to the Arctic Circle with Moscow taking the most definite steps to ensuring that it maintains its influence in the region.

As of December, Russia had finished equipping six new military bases throughout the Arctic in a move to recreate the country’s military presence to levels it had during the Cold War.

The six military bases are located throughout Russia and are placed on both the country’s northern shore and on outlying Arctic islands.

The locations are now fully equipped with the materials and amenities necessary for long-term deployments of soldiers to the region. 

Throughout this year, Moscow plans to begin sending hundreds of military servicemen to the Arctic bases.

The tri-border area (TBA) in Southeast Asia is comprised of the maritime zones of three states – the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia – in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea. Numerous shipping arteries traverse the TBA, presenting an alternative to the overcrowded Straits of Malacca (SOM) and carrying roughly $40 billion worth of cargo each year

However, the recent high-profile abductions of Indonesian and Malaysian sailors by alleged members of the Abu Sayyaf, a militant group from the Philippines, highlight the urgent need to remedy this maritime security gap

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, reported only 11 attacks in the TBA in 2015, mostly involving armed robbery against ships in port. The only confirmed incident of ship hijacking involved a tanker that was boarded in the vicinity of Lembeh Island in North Sulawesi, Indonesia. No one was harmed during the attack and the tanker’s crew was set adrift in a life raft

In this regard, it may be useful to consider, as a starting point, the forms and limits of coordination outlined in the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa (Yaoundé Code of Conduct), and the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Djibouti Code of Conduct). These non-binding Codes have been effective in limiting the number of piracy and armed robbery at sea incidents off the Gulf of Guinea and the Coast of Somalia

One possible course of action is for the three countries to earmark funds from their allocations under the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI), a regional capacity building effort meant to help some ASEAN member states (including Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines) and Taiwan to establish a shared MDA architecture, specifically for the TBA. Doing so may help re-focus attention on the TBA and channel the resources needed to detect potential threats, facilitate information sharing, and engage in collaborative security measures

The only network applicable to the TBA is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which entered into force on September 4, 2006 and which currently has 20 signatories: Australia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom, the United States, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam

Notably, Indonesia and Malaysia are not parties to the ReCAAP. Indonesia refused to join over concerns that the agreement would compromise its sovereignty. On the other hand, Malaysia objected to the fact that the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center (ISC), the facility through which the agreement would be operationalized, would be located in Singapore. It felt that doing so would undermine the IMB Piracy Reporting Center in Kuala Lumpur

A new video has emerged depicting a huge tunnel bomb which targeted the northern building blocks of the Zahraa district in Aleppo city. The incident was reported by al-Masdar two days ago and paved the way for a rebel assault on government positions in western Aleppo

In the past year, Islamist insurgents have increasingly relied on digging tunnels beneath Aleppo to target military outposts in the city.

It is unknown how many soldiers were killed in the tunnel attack; however, it likely killed all who were in the near vicinity of the buildings.

Indeed, some of [Russia's] new weapons – like the S-500 – are so capable that many US defense official worry that even stealth warplanes like the F-22, F-35 and the B-2 might have problems overcoming them," he observed

The S-500 Prometey, also known as 55R6M Triumfator-M, is a cutting-edge anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic missile system currently under development in Russia. It is meant to replace the S-300

The S-500, designed by Almaz Antey, is said to have a range of 600 kilometers (more than 370 miles). The system can simultaneously intercept up to ten ballistic and hypersonic missiles traveling at a speed of 7 kilometers per second. The Prometey is capable of engaging targets at an altitude of up to 200 kilometers (more than 120 miles)

The system is capable of intercepting aircraft and UAVs, as well as destroying low-earth-orbit satellites, space destruction devices and orbital weaponry

The square's Haji Ziad Restaurant, beloved for years by Ramadi residents for its grilled meats – flattened.

The restaurant was so popular its owner built a larger, fancier branch across the street three years ago. That, too, is now a pile of concrete and twisted iron rods

Photographs from satellite imagery and analytics company DigitalGlobe show more than 3,000 buildings and nearly 400 roads and bridges were damaged or destroyed between May 2015, when Ramadi fell to ISIS, and January 22, after most of the fighting had ended.

Over roughly the same period, nearly 800 civilians were killed in clashes, airstrikes and executions

When ISIS fighters withdraw, they leave an empty prize, blowing up buildings and wiring thousands of others with explosives. The bombs are so costly and time-consuming to defuse that much of recently liberated Iraq is now unlivable.

'All they leave is rubble,' said Major Mohammed Hussein, whose counterterrorism battalion was one of the first to move into Ramadi. 'You can't do anything with rubble.'

The new approach is particularly key as Iraq and the coalition build up to the daunting task of retaking Mosul, Iraq's second-biggest city, held by IS for nearly two years.

'They know they can't just turn Mosul into a parking lot,' said a Western diplomat in Baghdad who has been present for a number of meetings with coalition and Iraqi defense officials regarding the Mosul operation.

Militants took over homes, converting living rooms into command centers and bedrooms into barracks.

They dug tunnels under the streets to evade air strikes, shut down schools, looted and destroyed the homes of people associated with the local government. They set up a headquarters in the campus of Anbar University, on the city's western edge.

Over the course of the eight-month campaign to push ISIS out of Ramadi, coalition aircraft dropped more than 600 bombs on the city.

The strikes targeted ISIS fighters, but also destroyed bridges, buildings and roads, the Pentagon has acknowledged. Government forces seized districts on the outskirts and in December launched their final assault.

The complex is now largely destroyed. A gymnasium used by ISIS to store documents has been torched.

Charred sports equipment – a boxing glove, cleats, pieces of a track suit - line the hallways. Iraqi artillery fire punched thick holes into the university's library.

Only the two main reading rooms are safe to visit; the rest of the four-story building is believed to be booby-trapped.

Widespread destruction also can spark cycles of revenge attacks within Anbar's communities, where tribal law often demands death and destruction be repaid in 'blood money.'

In Ramadi's eastern edge, local security officials have already begun methodically razing homes of suspected ISIS sympathizers.

The helicopter with six people on board, including Deputy Plantation Industries and Commodities Minister Noriah Kasnon, went missing at about 5pm while heading to Kuching from a small town east of the state. A search and rescue operation was launched, but at press time, the helicopter remained missing

Malaysian Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein said on Twitter that he had ordered the air force and army to work together in the search and rescue operation. Deputy Premier Zahid Hamidi said the last known location of the helicopter was over a swampy coastal area, according to the New Straits Times. He said a special task force would be set up to probe the incident

To put the US advantage into perspective, Reddit user whiplashoo21, who runs the map-creation website Map Chart, made the following map depicting the total number of military aircraft in every country. In absolute numbers, the US is far and away the world’s dominant aerial power

The US boasts approximately 13,000 military aircraft. Comparatively, China and Russia, the world’s next-largest aerial powers, only have a total of 2,000 to 3,000 military aircraft each

The Shmel (Bumblebee) portable flame rocket launchers were used by Soviet troops in Afghanistan and by Russian troops in Chechnya.
Its modernized version, the PRO-A Shmel single-shot disposable flamethrower, is designed for use in urban areas and can destroy targets within 50 square meters in open spaces and within 80 square meters indoors, gazeta.ru reported.

It can also hit targets located at a distance of 700 meters and is nicknamed “a sniper flamethrower” by the Russian military.

The RPO-A Shmel is a next generation man-portable high-precision assault weapon that can act in a variety of fire support mission types in close combat situations.

Thirty years ago Soviet forces in Afghanistan received the first models of the latest Shmel infantry flamethrower for testing.

Firing fuel-air explosive rounds, the effect of the man-portable launcher was often as devastating as a 150 mm heavy artillery shell, and quickly earned it a nickname drawn from Islamic mythology: “Shaitan’s (the Devil’s) pipe.”

“Unreliable evidence is clouding the international discourse on the South China Sea disputes.”

Consider, for instance, the argument that China, far from being the aggressor in the South China Sea

Vietnam has “doubled its holdings” in the South China Sea in the past 20 years

Even if one assumes that Vietnam occupied 24 features in 1996 (the actual data from which the map often drawn for this line of argument actually specifies 22)

The source for this claim – a 2015 congressional testimony by a senior U.S. defense official – in fact specified 48 outposts amongst the features occupied by Vietnam in the Spratly Islands, rather than 48 features. Using a 20-year timeline is also equally misleading because it leaves out China’s seizure of Mischief Reed 21 years ago

Vietnam

Vietnam currently occupies 21 features in the Spratly Islands, with the latest taken a few days after a bloody clash on March 14, 1988 with China at Johnson South Reef. A full list of these features with their names and coordinates was publicized in the April 22, 1988 issue of Nhan Dan, the Vietnamese government’s mouthpiece. They are:

Southwest Cay (Vietnamese: Song Tu Tay),
South Reef (Da Nam),
Petley Reef (Nui Thi or Da Thi),
Sand Cay (Son Ca),
Namyit Island (Nam Yet),
Discovery Great Reef (Da Lon),
Sin Cowe Island (Sinh Ton),
Collins Reef (Co Lin),
Lansdowne Reef (Len Dao),
Sin Cowe East Island (Sinh Ton Dong),
Ladd Reef (Da Lat),
Spratly Island (Truong Sa or Truong Sa Lon),
West Reef (Da Tay),
Central Reef (Truong Sa Dong),
East Reef (Da Dong),
Pearson Reef (Phan Vinh),
Allison Reef (Toc Tan),
Cornwallis South Reef (Nui Le),
Pigeon or Tennent Reef (Tien Nu),
Barque Canada Reef (Thuyen Chai),
Amboyna Cay (An Bang).

S. Department of Defense (DoD) identified 34 outposts on these 21 features

Vietnam also has a similar counting system, but it identifies only 33 outposts (diem dong quan or diem dao in Vietnamese). Why the discrepancy? The extra outpost counted by DoD is a lighthouse on Tennent Reef

Philippines

Philippine media typically reports either nine or ten Philippine-held features in the Spratly Islands. The tenth feature is Irving Reef (Filipino: Balagtas), which lies between Loaita Bank and West York Island. There are no structures on this reef, but unverified sources report that Philippine Navy ships take turns to guard the feature. If this is true, the status of Irving is similar to that of several other features that are watched by Chinese and Vietnamese vessels but remain unoccupied.

Given this, the nine features held by the Philippines in the Spratly Islands are:

Northeast Cay (Filipino: Parola),
Thitu Island (Pag-asa),
Loaita Cay (Panata),
Loaita Island (Kota),
West York Island (Likas),
Flat Island (Patag),
Nanshan Island (Lawak),
Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin),
Commodore Reef (Rizal).

APMSS map shows no outpost at Lankiam Cay. Instead, it locates the second Philippine outpost in Loaita Bank at an unidentified reef northwest of Loaita Island. Some Chinese and Vietnamese sources identify this Philippine-occupied feature as Loaita Nan. However, the coordinates commonly associated with Loaita Nan (100 42.5’ N, 1140 19.5’ E) refer to the reef that forms the western edge of Loaita Bank, where no structures are visible from satellite images available in Google Maps. At the same time, small structures are visible on Loaita Cay (100 44’ N, 1140 21’ E), which might be thought of as part of Loaita Nan but actually lies east across a seven-meter deep channel. Loaita Cay is 6.5 nm northwest of Loaita Island

Between 1970 and 1978, the Philippine moved in to occupy seven features in the Spratlys, with troops stationed on five islands. Flat Island, which lies about 6 nm north of Nanshan Island, appeared to be controlled by a garrison based at Nanshan until 2011, when some starshell-like structures were built on Flat to house a more permanent presence. A documentary produced by a local TV network in 2004 reported that only four soldiers were guarding both features from their shelters on Nanshan

In 1999, the Philippines occupied Second Thomas Shoal by running the tank landing ship BRP Sierra Madre aground and using it as a shelter for a small garrison. Of note, the Pentagon does not count the Philippine station on Second Thomas Shoal as an outpost

Taiwan

Itu Aba Island (Chinese: 太平島) is the only feature occupied by Taiwan in the Spratlys. It is also the largest natural land feature in the archipelago. Taiwan sometimes is said to hold two features there. This is likely to be inferred from reports of Taiwan erecting structures (in 1995 and 2004) and its officials landing (in 2003 and 2012) on Ban Than Reef. However, the best description of Ban Than’s current status is “unoccupied.” Ban Than has a beach less than 100 meters long, which lies about 2.5 nm from Itu Aba and about 4 nm from the Vietnamese-occupied Sand Cay. The Pentagon identifies no outpost on Ban Than, and no structures are visible in recent satellite images as well as photos of the reef. Sources with local knowledge told me that both Taiwanese and Vietnamese troops have occasionally planted materials on Ban Than and used them as targets for their live-fire exercises.

China

In the Spratly Islands, China has occupied six features since 1988 and Mischief Reef since 1995. The seven features occupied by China in the Spratly Islands are:

Subi Reef (Chinese: 渚碧礁 Zhubi Jiao),
Gaven Reef (南薰礁 Nanxun Jiao),
Hughes Reef (东门礁 Dongmen Jiao),
Johnson South Reef (赤瓜礁 Chigua Jiao),
Fiery Cross Reef (永暑礁 Yongshu Jiao),
Cuarteron Reef (华阳礁 Huayang Jiao),
Mischief Reef (美济礁 Meiji Jiao).

When the Pentagon in May 2015 said there were eight Chinese outposts in the Spratly Islands, some thought that the eighth was Eldad Reef. But the APMSS map released three months later shows two outposts on Mischief alone, and none on Eldad. This is a fact that has often been missed

The mistaken status of Eldad, Whitsun, and Ladd Reefs is likely to have been inferred from reports about Vietnam protesting against Chinese troops landing on Eldad Reef in 1990, Da Ba Dau in March 1992 and Da Lac in July 1992

Several stories in the Vietnamese social media suggest that Eldad, Whitsun, and McKennan are frequently sites of quiet cat-and-mouse games between China and Vietnam, one attempting to get a foothold on these ‘new islands’ while the other tries to frustrate these efforts

Malaysia

As with the case of the Philippines, the number of Malaysian-held features in the Spratlys varies depending on how one defines occupation. Most accounts typically speak of either five or eight features. Malaysia has troops and facilities stationed on five features:

Swallow Reef (Malay: Layang-Layang), since 1983,
Ardasier Reef (Ubi), since 1986,
Mariveles Reef (Mantanani), since 1986,
Erica Reef (Siput), since 1999,
Investigator Shoal (Peninjau), since 1999

Several sources also list three more features, including Dallas Reef (Laya), Royal Charlotte Reef (Semarang Barat Besar), and Louisa Reef (Semarang Barat Kecil), as occupied by Malaysia. However, more recent, reliable, and knowledgeable sources from Malaysia, Brunei, and the United States confirm that there are in fact no troops stationed on these three features

Malaysia appears to “occupy” Dallas Reef in a similar way to how the Philippines did with Flat Island. Troops from nearby Ardasier Reef, which lies about 3 nm from Dallas Reef, may watch and visit the latter on a regular basis. Royal Charlotte and Louisa Reefs, on the other hand, can hardly be classified as “occupied.” While there is a beacon on Royal Charlotte, visitors report that it was inactive and there were no others structures on the reef. Visitors have also found Louisa deserted with no other structures than an obelisk-shaped beacon, which was also not working. Among these eight features, Swallow, Mariveles, Erica, Royal Charlotte, and Louisa Reefs reportedly have some natural portions protruding above high tide, while Ardasier, Dallas, and Investigator are likely low-tide elevations. The beacons on Royal Charlotte and Louisa might have been built by Malaysia in the 1980s as a means to assert sovereignty over the two reefs

Brunei

The only feature in the Spratly Islands that is claimed by Brunei is Louisa Reef. According to official statements by Malaysia and Brunei, an Exchange of Letters signed in 2009 has “established the final delimitation of territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone” between the two countries. The agreement unequivocally states that Brunei has sovereignty over two oil blocks within which Louisa Reef is located.

Although Malaysia has not officially dropped its territorial claims over this feature, the agreement with Brunei substantially weakens Malaysia’s claims. As both Malaysia and Brunei have grounded their sovereignty claims over Louisa on the basis of coastal state rights, Malaysia’s acknowledgement of Brunei’s territorial sea, continental shelf, and EEZ is tantamount to effectively conceding Louisa Reef to Brunei. However, this appears to be a tacit understanding rather than an official agreement of any kind. The Exchange of Letters has yet to be publicized, and even if it would be made public, there would likely be no mentioning of Louisa. This is certainly the case with Limbang District, the other territorial dispute between Brunei and Malaysia.

Kurdish news network Rudaw interviews Peshmerga fighters who were involved in the battle in which U.S. Navy SEAL Charlie Keating was killed in northern Iraq. The indigenous fighters tell of the courageousness and impressive fighting skill of the elite American warriors, giving us a little more insight into what happened that day. Interestingly, one of the Peshmerga explains how a British advisor was shot in the head. It’s entirely possible he was referring to Keating, as no other reports have indicated a U.K. death in the incident, but further clarification is needed

True, the Project 885 Yasen class is impressive. Armed with cruise, antiship and anti-submarine missiles, the highly autonomous nuclear-powered multipurpose attack submarine is a force to be reckoned with. It is fast, silent and deep-diving.

Thanks to its unique features, the Yasen class "came as an unpleasant surprise to the United States," Lukanin observed. "Americans are concerned that our silent subs could largely neutralize [Washington's] ballistic missile defense system."

In conformance with dwifungsi, the TNI had significant administrative and political influence.  Indonesia’s external maritime environment, including the South China Sea, was simply a non-factor in Jakarta’s strategic thinking

Concerns about territorial disputes in the South China Sea would be managed by: (1) affirming that Indonesia was not a claimant in those disputes; (2) offering Indonesia’s services as a mediator and facilitator; and (3) championing ASEAN’s proposal for a binding “Code of Conduct” that would eschew coercion and conflict to be signed by all interested parties in the South China Sea

Instead of agreeing to a Code of Conduct, China asserted territorial ambitions that included “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea – backed up with rapidly growing naval and quasi-naval deployments and the seizure and construction of island features.  On several occasions over the last four years, Chinese maritime police reportedly used threats of force to protect Chinese fishermen operating in Indonesia’s EEZ

As Indonesia began towing the Chinese boat toward port, a Chinese Maritime Enforcement vessel intervened and forced the Indonesians to surrender the boat.  The fishermen, however, remain in Indonesian custody.  China has demanded their return claiming they were operating lawfully in “traditional Chinese fishing grounds.” The Indonesian response has revealed a degree of strategic disarray in Jakarta

The Minister for Maritime Affairs accused China of supporting illegal fishing in Indonesian waters and demanded the Chinese boat be handed over.  However, the Deputy Foreign Minister stressed “that Indonesia and China do not have a border problem.”

Economically, Indonesia already estimates that it loses up to $5 billion annually to foreign fishing fleets operating in Indonesian waters

Such a stance would include a formal statement from the President (to give Indonesian strategy one voice) that continued unauthorized fishing by foreign fleets, including Chinese, in Indonesia’s EEZ would be illegal under international and Indonesian law and, if supported by a foreign government, would be viewed as an unfriendly, even hostile, act

Steps to give such a policy credibility would include: (1) seeking a common understanding with Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines regarding mutual EEZ demarcations and rights; (2) invest as rapidly as possible in maritime military surface and air assets to monitor and patrol Indonesian waters; (3) initiate accelerated cooperation with the United States and Japan as sources for concessional procurement of military and reconnaissance platforms; (4) give priority to a program of joint naval exercises with the U.S. Navy; and (5) consider seeking a formal legal judgment from the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea concerning EEZ rights and access

It would require a radical reworking of the software and hardware of the TNI – a new TNI would see itself as externally focused with a primary maritime mission.  That would require a much modernized Navy (TNI-AL) with greatly expanded littoral capabilities. The Indonesian government would need to abandon treasured illusions, i.e. the honest broker and the ASEAN Code of Conduct