QUOTE(MilitaryMadness @ Mar 11 2016, 09:59 AM)
The problem with testing anti-ship missiles is that the target is always a empty stripped hull without the damage-control equipment and personnel of a running ship. With the target unable to mount any sort of defense (figuratively a sitting duck), the test will be more about testing the accuracy and evaluating the performance of the missile rather than its destructive effects. You're better off floating an 'x' in the middle of the ocean and shooting at that.
This will always skew the advantage of the test in favor of the missile, seeing its target is just a floating piece of hull with no means to avoid, fight back or even contain the damage. It's the equivalent of testing a tank's battle performance by shooting at a static farmhouse instead of another active, fighting tank. In the end you just get a blown up farmhouse and nothing more. You can never get the sort of data you need testing against something like that.
As far I don't think no country dare to test anti ship missiles on a fully functional ship and see how extensive the damage will be with damage-control protocols in place and working. So I take all of these tests with the usual grain of salt.
if you have to ask.... the Falklands War witnessed the sinking of HMS Sheffield by Exocet launched by Argies. This will always skew the advantage of the test in favor of the missile, seeing its target is just a floating piece of hull with no means to avoid, fight back or even contain the damage. It's the equivalent of testing a tank's battle performance by shooting at a static farmhouse instead of another active, fighting tank. In the end you just get a blown up farmhouse and nothing more. You can never get the sort of data you need testing against something like that.
As far I don't think no country dare to test anti ship missiles on a fully functional ship and see how extensive the damage will be with damage-control protocols in place and working. So I take all of these tests with the usual grain of salt.
Sinking[edit]
Sheffield was first detected by an Argentine Naval Aviation patrol aircraft Lockheed SP-2H Neptune (2-P-112) at 7:50 AM on 4 May 1982. The Neptune kept the British ships under surveillance, verifying Sheffield's position again at 8:14 and 8:43. Two Argentine Navy Super Étendards (3-A-202 and 3-A-203) both armed with Exocets took off from Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego at 9:45 and met with an Argentine Air Force tanker KC-130H Hercules at 10:00 hours.
At 10:35, the Neptune climbed to 1,170 metres (3,840 ft) and detected a large and two medium-sized contacts at the coordinates 52°33′55″S, 57°40′55″W map. A few minutes later, the Neptune contacted both Super Étendards with this information. Flying at very low altitude, around 10:50, both Super Étendards climbed to 160 metres (520 ft) to verify these contacts, but, not finding any, decided to continue. 25 miles (40 km) later they climbed again and, after a few seconds of scanning, the targets appeared on their radar screens.[4][5]
Both pilots loaded the coordinates in their weapons systems, returned to low level, and after last minute checks, launched their AM39 Exocets at 11:04 from 20 to 30 miles (32 to 48 km) away from their targets. The Super Étendards did not need to refuel from the KC-130 again, which had been waiting, and landed at Rio Grande at 12:04. Supporting the mission were an Argentine Air Force Learjet 35 as a decoy and two IAI Daggers as the KC-130 escorts[4][5]
At approximately 10 a.m. on 4 May, Sheffield was at defence watches, second degree readiness, as part of the British Task Force dispatched to the Falkland Islands during the Falklands War. Sheffield had relieved her sister Coventry as the latter was having technical trouble with her Type 965 radar.[6] Sheffield and Coventry were chatting over UHF. Communications ceased until an unidentified message was heard flatly stating "Sheffield is hit".[6]
The flagship, Hermes dispatched the escorts Arrow and Yarmouth to investigate, and a helicopter was launched. Confusion reigned until Sheffield's Lynx helicopter unexpectedly landed aboard Hermes carrying the air operations officer and operations officer,[6] confirming the strike.
Sheffield picked up the incoming missiles on her Type 965 radar (an interim fitting until the Type 1022 set was available), and the operations officer informed the missile director, who queried the contacts in the ADAWS 4 fire control system.[6] The launch aircraft had not been detected as the British had expected, and it was not until smoke was sighted that the target was confirmed as sea skimming missiles. Five seconds later, an Exocet hit Sheffield amidships, approximately 8 feet (2.4 m) above the waterline on deck 2, tearing a gash in the hull.[6] The other missile splashed into the sea half a mile off her port beam.[7]
Damage caused by the missile impact severed the high-pressure fire main on board. The resultant fire caused by burning propellant ignited diesel oil from the ready-use tanks in the engine room, and other inflammable materials used in the ship's construction. These fires burned unchecked for a number of days after the ship was abandoned.
The MOD Board of Inquiry on the sinking of the Sheffield concluded that: "Evidence indicates that the warhead did not detonate".[10] Some of the crew and members of the Task Force believe that the missile's 165 kilogram warhead had detonated.[6] This was supported by a MOD re-assessment of the loss of the 'Sheffield' which reported in Summer 2015. In a paper delivered to the RINA Warship Conference in Bath in June 2015 it was concluded that the Exocet warhead did detonate inside 'Sheffield', with the conclusion supported by analysis using modern damage analysis tools not available in 1982 and evidence from weapon hits and trials conducted since the end of the Falklands Campaign.[11]
This post has been edited by TechSuper: Mar 11 2016, 01:53 PM
Mar 11 2016, 12:32 PM

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