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Insiden Serangan 911 – Cawangan Khas Antara Agensi Perisikan Terulung

Tarikh 11 Sept setiap tahun akan terus dikenang dalam sejarah sebagai satu-satunya peristiwa serangan pengganas paling besar pernah dilancarkan ke atas Amerika Syarikat. Semua agensi keselamatan dan agensi perisikan bukan saja di Amerika Syarikat malahan di seluruh dunia tergamam dengan impak, perancangan teliti, komitmen dan keberanian Kumpulan Al-Qaeda yang mendalangi serangan 911 tersebut.

Apa yang tidak diketahui umum samada di peringkat antarabangsa mahupun di Malaysia adalah penglibatan Bahagian Counter Terrorism Cawangan Khas PDRM dalam mengumpul inteligen awal mengenai kehadiran operatif-operatif Al-Qaeda di Malaysia pada Disember 1999 … 22 bulan sebelum serangan 911 dilancarkan. Cawangan khas ketika itu diterajui oleh salah seorang pengarah yang amat dihormati samada di Malaysia, serantau, mahupun di peringkat antarabangsa iaitu CP Datuk Yusof Rahaman. Saya amat beruntung kerana pernah berkhidmat di bawah pimpinan, seliaan dan bimbingan Datuk Yusof Rahaman sejak saja menyertai Cawangan Khas iaitu pada tahun 1993. Datuk Yusof Rahaman ketika itu merupakan Penolong Pengarah di Bahagian Inteligen Luar dan saya ketika itu mengetuai unit kecil Counter Terrorism di bawah Bahagian Inteligen Luar.

Saya yang ketika itu berpangkat ASP mengetuai unit Counter Terrorism sebelum dibesarkan menjadi Seksyen, Bahagian, Jabatan Pasukan Petugas Khas (Operasi / Counter Terrorism) sebelum dibubarkan dan diserap kembali ke Cawangan Khas menjadi Bahagian Counter Terrorism E8M tahun 2013. Dari pangkat ASP sehingga DCP saya bertugas dalam operasi-operasi menangani ancaman pengganas antarabangsa di Bahagian Counter Terrorism.

Di bawah kepimpinan Datuk Yusof Rahaman, prestasi Cawangan Khas berada di puncak. Saya turut bertuah kerana turut dibimbing oleh pegawai-pegawai kanan Bahagian Inteligen Luar, Cawangan Khas yang memang berpengalaman dalam selok-belok pengumpulan inteligen dan operasi sulit seperti Dato’ Hasan Ahmad, Dato’ C.Pakianathan dan SAC Azmi Zain. Pegawai-pegawai kanan Cawangan Khas inilah yang banyak membimbing, mengajar dan memberi peluang kepada saya untuk mengembangkan karier saya dalam Cawangan Khas.

Dengan pengalaman dan ketelitian Datuk Yusof Rahaman banyak operasi-operasi ke atas elemen pengganas samada dari dalam mahupun luar negara dapat dilumpuhkan khususnya di antara tahun 1994 – 2006. Dalam konteks inteligen berhubung elemen-elemen pengganas antarabangsa yang diperolehi dari agensi perisikan luar, Datuk Yusof Rahaman akan meneliti setiap satu dan akan memberi arahan selanjutnya.

Salah satu inteligen yang diperolehi adalah dari agensi perisikan Amerika Syarikat pada akhir Disember 1999 iaitu mengenai kehadiran anasir-anasir Al-Qaeda di Kuala Lumpur. Inteligen tersebut tidak mendedahkan tujuan dan perancangan operatif tersebut di Malaysia.

Pada 4 Januari 2000 agensi perisikan Amerika Syarikat telah menyalurkan maklumat tambahan yang lebih terperinci mengenai penerbangan, butir-butir peribadi, dan gambar Khalid Al-Mihdhar (KAM) anggota kanan AQ yang akan memasuki Malaysia melalui KLIA.

Saya dan beberapa pegawai saya turun ke KLIA pada malam 4 Januari 2000 untuk ‘memantau’ dan mengesahkan kehadiran KAM. Saya bersama Insp Mohd Raby dan Insp Ooi Yuet Kueh turun ke KLIA. Ketika KAM berada di kawasan ‘baggage carousel’, Insp Mohd Raby telah berjaya mengenalpasti KAM berdasarkan gambar yang disalurkan. Insp Mohd Raby terus memaklumkan kepada saya…. saya tidak menyangka bahawa inilah suspek yang kemudiannya bersama 4 lagi anggota Al-Qaeda terlibat dalam merampas dan merempuh Pentagon pada 11 September 2001 (64 penumpang dan 125 mangsa di darat terkorban dalam serangan itu). KAM yang memakai baju “long sleeve” hitam melintasi betul-betul di hadapan saya sambil berjalan dengan begnya. Kami bertiga terus mengekori KAM dari jarak “selamat” sebelum memaklumkan kepada team ‘Surveillance Operation (SO)” yang menanti di luar balai ketibaan. KAM disambut oleh seorang warga Arab yang merupakan pelajar sebuah universiti tempatan yang bekerja sambilan dengan “travel agency”. Mereka berlepas dari KLIA dan menginap di hotel bajet di kawasan Bukit Bintang.

Pengintipan yang dilancarkan ke atas KAM sepanjang berada di sekitar Bukit Bintang KL dan Bandar Sg Long Kajang, Selangor telah berjaya mengesan dan mengenalpasti lain-lain operatif AQ yang memasuki Malaysia lebih awal. Mereka adalah Nawaf Al-Hazmi, Salah Saed @ Khallad Attash dan Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh.

Khallad Attash adalah salah seorang anggota AQ yang terlibat dalam serangan ke atas Kedutaan Amerika Syarikat di Tanzania dan Kenya pada 7 Ogos 1998 dan cubaan serangan ke atas USS The Sullivans di Aden, Yemen pada 3 Januari 2000 tetapi gagal kerana bot yang membawa bahan letupan tenggelam. Pada 12 Oktober 2000 iaitu selepas 11 bulan kehadirannya di Malaysia, Khallad Attash berjaya menyelaras operasi serangan berani mati ke atas USS Cole di Aden, Yemen.

Keempat-empat mereka berada di Malaysia dari 4 hingga 8 Januari 2000. Mereka merupakan operatif yang terlatih kerana tidak pernah menggunakan telefon di bilik hotel penginapan mereka atau rumah penginapan mereka untuk membuat panggilan telefon. Sebaliknya menggunakan telefon awam dan internet café di Kawasan Bukit Bintang. Salah satu telefon awam yang sering digunakan oleh mereka adalah di hadapan Menara Maybank Jalan Tun Perak, Kuala Lumpur.

Kami berjaya mendapatkan ‘toll records’ panggilan –panggilan yang dibuat di “public phone” tersebut dan dikongsi dengan perisikan Amerika Syarikat. Nombor antarabangsa yang dihubungi termasuk beberapa negara Timur Tengah, antaranya yang mempunyai hubungan dengan operatif-operatif kanan AQ.

Salah satu nombor antarabangsa tersebut adalah nombor Yemen milik Ahmad Al-Hada, bapa mertua KAM. No. telefon yang sama pernah dikesan mempunyai hubungan dengan Sel Al-Qaeda yang telibat dalam serangan Kedutaan Amerika Syarikat di Tanzania dan Kenya pada 7 Ogos 1998.

Apabila KAM, Khallad Attash dan Nawaz Al Hazim berlepas ke Bangkok pada 9 Jan 2000, semua maklumat mengenai penerbangan, passport dan nombor-nombor panggilan antarabangsa yang mereka hubungi melalui “public phone” di kongsi dengan agensi perisikan Amerika Syarikat. Tetapi agensi perisikan Amerika Syarikat berkenaan tidak menyalurkan semua maklumat itu dengan Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Semua kelemahan dalam perkongsian inteligen di antara agensi perisikan Amerika Syarikat dengan FBI dinyatakan dengan jelas dalam 911 Commission Report. Ada dua buku, The Looming Tower oleh Lawrence Wright dan The Black Banners oleh Ali Soufan (Bekas Agen FBI yang terlibat dalam siasatan ke atas serangan USS Cole dan 911) yang menceritakan dengan jelas kerjasama CK PDRM dalam perkongsian inteligen mengenai operatif-operatif AQ yang terlibat dalam serangan 911.

Saya yang ketika itu merupakan “Case Officer” siasatan ke atas KAM dan lain-lain operatif AQ di Malaysia, meneruskan pemantauan ke atas Yazid Sufaat dan lain-lain anggota Jemaah Islamiah (JI) yang dikesan mempunyai hubungan dengan anggota AQ tersebut. Satu laporan lengkap dihantar kepada Penolong Pengarah Bahagian Inteligen Luar Cawangan Khas untuk terus memantau rakyat Malaysia tersebut. Daripada pemantauan berterusan tersebutlah kami dapat mengesan kewujudan kumpulan Jemaah Islamiah dan melancarkan operasi besar-besaran pada 11 Disember 2001. Cawangan Khas merupakan agensi perisikan pertama yang berjaya membongkar sel-sel kumpulan JI yang beroperasi di Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapura, Filipina, Australia dan Thailand. Kejayaan ini mendapat pengiktirafan di peringkat antarabangsa.

Kejayaan Cawangan Khas dalam membongkar jaringan kerja Al Qaeda dan JI bukan atas kejayaan Bahagian Counter Terrorism semata-mata tetapi gabungan semua bahagian-bahagian lain dalam Cawangan Khas yang kebanyakkanya berkhidmat “di belakang tabir” tetapi sumbangan mereka adalah besar dalam menjaga keamanan dan ketenteraman di Malaysia. Kejayaan besar kami ini juga adalah kerana dibimbing oleh pengarah, pegawai tertinggi Cawangan Khas yang berpengalaman, teliti dan komited dalam menjalankan tugas dan memegang kemas amanah yang diberikan.

AYOB KHAN BIN MYDIN PITCHAY
11 SEPT. 2025.

The 9/11 Incident – Special Branch Among the World’s Premier
Intelligence Agencies

11 September will forever be remembered in history as the single largest terrorist attack ever launched against the United States. All security and intelligence agencies, not only in the US but also worldwide, were stunned by the impact, meticulous planning, commitment, and courage of the Al-Qaeda group behind the 9/11 attacks.

What is not widely known internationally, or even in Malaysia, is the involvement of the Counter Terrorism Division of the Royal Malaysia Police Special Branch (SB) in gathering early intelligence on the presence of Al-Qaeda operatives in Malaysia as early as December 1999 … 22 months before the 9/11 attacks were carried out. At that time, the Special Branch was led by one of its most respected Director, regionally and internationally - CP Datuk Yusof Rahaman. I was fortunate to have served under the leadership, supervision, and guidance of Datuk Yusof Rahaman since I joined the Special Branch in 1993. At that time, Datuk Yusof Rahaman was the Assistant Director of the External Division, while I headed a small Counter Terrorism unit under the same division.

As an ASP then, I led the Counter Terrorism unit before it was expanded into a Section, then a Division, later known as the Special Task Force (Operations/Counter Terrorism), before being dissolved and absorbed back into the Special Branch as the Counter Terrorism Division E8M in 2013. From the rank of ASP up to DCP, I served in operations tackling international terrorist threats under this division.

Under Datuk Yusof Rahaman’s leadership, the Special Branch reached its peak performance. I was also fortunate to be mentored by senior officers of the External Division, Special Branch, who were highly experienced in intelligence gathering and covert operations, such as Dato’ Hasan Ahmad, Dato’ C. Pakianathan, and SAC Azmi Zain. These senior SB officers guided, taught, and gave me opportunities to develop my career in the Special Branch.

Thanks to Datuk Yusof Rahaman’s experience and meticulous approach, many operations against terrorist elements; domestic and foreign - were successfully thwarted, especially between 1994 and 2006. When it came to intelligence shared by foreign intelligence agencies about international terrorist elements, Datuk Yusof Rahaman would carefully analyze each detail before giving further directives.

One such piece of intelligence came from a US intelligence agency in late December 1999 regarding the presence of Al-Qaeda operatives in Kuala Lumpur. The intelligence did not reveal their purpose or plans in Malaysia.

On 4 January 2000, US intelligence provided additional details regarding flight information, personal data, and a photograph of Khalid Al-Mihdhar (KAM), a senior Al-Qaeda member who was about to enter Malaysia via KLIA.

That night, my team and I went to KLIA to monitor and confirm KAM’s arrival. Together with Insp Mohd Raby and Insp Ooi Yuet Kueh, I monitored him. While KAM was at the baggage carousel, Insp Mohd Raby successfully identified him based on the photograph provided. He immediately informed me. Little did I know at the time that this suspect, together with four other Al-Qaeda members, would later hijack and crash into the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 (killing 64 passengers and 125 victims on the ground). KAM, wearing a black long-sleeved shirt, walked right past me with his bag. The three of us trailed him at a safe distance before alerting the Surveillance Operation (SO) team waiting outside the arrival hall. KAM was met by an Arab student from a local university, who was working part-time with a travel agency. They left KLIA and stayed at a budget hotel in Bukit Bintang.

Surveillance conducted on KAM during his stay in Bukit Bintang, Kuala Lumpur, and Bandar Sungai Long, Kajang, Selangor, therefore we managed to surface other Al-Qaeda operatives who had entered Malaysia earlier. They were Nawaf Al-Hazmi, Salah Saed @ Khallad Attash, and Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh.

Khallad Attash was one of the Al-Qaeda operatives involved in the US Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya on 7 August 1998, and the attempted attack on USS The Sullivans in Aden, Yemen, on 3 January 2000 (which failed when the explosives-laden boat sank). On 12 October 2000, 11 months after his stay in Malaysia, Khallad Attash successfully coordinated the suicide attack on USS Cole in Aden, Yemen.

All four men stayed in Malaysia between 4 and 8 January 2000. They were highly trained operatives who never used hotel or guesthouse phones to make calls, instead relying on public phones and internet cafes around Bukit Bintang. One of their most frequently used public phones was located in front of Menara Maybank, Jalan Tun Perak, Kuala Lumpur.

We managed to obtain toll records of the calls made from that public phone and shared them with US intelligence agency. The international numbers dialed included several Middle East countries, some linked to senior Al-Qaeda operatives.

One of those international numbers belonged to Ahmad Al-Hada of Yemen, KAM’s father-in-law. That same phone number had previously been connected to the Al-Qaeda cell responsible for the US Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya on 7 August 1998.

When KAM, Khallad Attash, and Nawaf Al-Hazmi departed for Bangkok on 9 January 2000, all their flight details, passport numbers, and international phone contacts from the public phone were shared with US intelligence agency. However, that US agency did not share all of the information with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

These shortcomings in intelligence sharing between US intelligence agencies and the FBI were clearly highlighted in the 9/11 Commission Report. Two books - The Looming Tower by Lawrence Wright and The Black Banners by Ali Soufan (a former FBI agent involved in the USS Cole and 9/11 investigations) - describe in detail the cooperation of the RMP Special Branch in sharing intelligence on the Al-Qaeda operatives involved in 9/11.

As the “Case Officer” for the investigation into KAM and other Al-Qaeda operatives in Malaysia, I continued monitoring Yazid Sufaat and other Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members who were found to have links with these Al-Qaeda operatives. A complete report was submitted to the Assistant Director of the External Division to continue monitoring these Malaysians. Through continuous surveillance, we uncovered the existence of the Jemaah Islamiyah network and launched a large-scale operation on 11 December 2001. The Special Branch was the first intelligence agency to successfully expose JI cells operating in Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand - a success recognized internationally.

The success of the Special Branch in uncovering Al-Qaeda and JI networks was not solely the achievement of the Counter Terrorism Division but the result of cooperation across all SB divisions, many of which worked “behind the scenes” but made significant contributions to maintaining peace and security in Malaysia. Our major successes were also due to the guidance of experienced, meticulous, and committed SB directors and senior officers who upheld their duties with utmost integrity.

Ayob Khan bin Mydin Pitchay
11 September 2025

WOT kek

TLDR

Got ai summary and shiet?

i also TLDR that...so, copy/paste Deepseek

Long weekend is NOT meant for reading this

Apa lagi yang tak tau? Need 100 years anniversary baru tau semua?

so wat u want us to do now?

so malayisa is not helping our brother to win the war, malaysia is on USA side,

Lol...mangsa sosma yg kena tahan kat perlis tu apa cerita??

TLDR

the local Special Branch have already tracked the terrorists in Malaysia (staying at KL before leaving KLIA for Bangkok).

The local Special Branch has passed on the info to the US intelligence but the US intelligence didn't pass on the info to FBI

something like that

Msians were among 911 victims. Only sohai sided with terrorists. Terrorist will never even care if u will be among collateral kill in their attack.

Talk and write so much but nothing is done to push back against extreme Islamic speech and teaching.

In fact, the more extreme the more rewarding it is in this country until the extremism backfired on themselves, then only action is taken.

Zakir Naik here inciting hate , lek jer.. observe observe observe dulu