DEPLOYMENT

Kua seems to have a bone of contention with the Malaysian Armed Forces' (MAF) deployment in Sabah. To question the 10th Para Brigade's state of preparedness and its willingness to repel the enemy in Lahad Datu is a poorly-deduced presumption. The intruders who posed as the "Royal Sulu Army" did not even bear a remote semblance to a bona fide army. No decent army would deploy a ragtag team of 200 men to invade, or stake a claim, to foreign sovereign territory. These intruders were rightfully recognised as "terrorists'' as they simply came to create terror and cause bloodshed. They appear to be mercenaries in the employ of shameless, attention-seeking individuals who may have additional ulterior motives.

The 10th Para Brigade is a Rapid Deployment Force. They have been formed, trained and equipped to engage an adversary larger than these ragtag misfits, within and outside our borders. Today, these elite troops are deployed in Sabah along with other army formations to support the police and relevant government agencies within the wider context of national security. Its deployment in Sabah makes not only good sense but serves a larger role in anticipation of other eventualities.

Similarly, fighter jets used for the recent bombardment missions in Sabah clearly represented the better option. Given the limitations on placing observed artillery and mortar fire by land forces on moving targets, aerial bombardment was probably the best option. As correctly pointed out by Kua, "future wars" (he agrees that wars may still occur) will involve Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). However, these drones cannot be expected to undertake aerial combat against invading fighter jets. No nation bent on defending its airspace and territorial integrity is thinking of obviating combat aircraft anytime soon; not even the United States.

The contention that there was "no cordon" around the east coast of Sabah to prevent intruders is true to a certain extent. But blaming the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) per se for not having a cordon in place is also not only unfair and but also preposterous. The porous maritime border in east Sabah is just one small sector of the overall equation. The RMN has to patrol maritime boundaries which we share with six other nations. Our maritime resources, which span waters measuring 600,000 sq km, too need routine patrolling and protection. This does not include large expanses of water straddled between east and west Malaysia, and those skirting the Exclusive Economic Zones.

Naval vessels are also required to sail beyond our borders on peacekeeping, escort and training missions. And just like any other navy in the world, the RMN is also beset with seaworthiness concerns of its vessels. In short, the RMN with its limited assets cannot be expected to place a permanent cordon along a coastline of 1,400km. At best it can carry out routine patrols, maintain a minimum deterrent presence and concurrently support the enforcement tasks of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA).

Recent surveys have vindicated the armed forces as a trusted national institution. It will remain so and can be expected to guard the realm in the face of the gravest threats. But to accomplish that, our troops must be reasonably well trained and equipped. To assume that regional defence agreements with our neighbours will result in "zero" acts of aggressions against our territorial integrity and interests constitutes naivety of the highest order.

The dictum that there are neither eternal friends nor perpetual enemies but only permanent interests remains perennially true. As evidenced by the recent intrusion, the (so called) Sultan of Sulu (neither a friend nor an enemy), is still staking a dubious claim to territory that has long been internationally recognised as belonging to Malaysia. Malaysia did not usurp this territory. It was a legacy of our independence from Britain, just like any other state in Peninsular Malaysia. This episode is a timely reminder to be constantly alert and prepared for any wildcard situation in the future. While our Asean neighbours may abide by international laws to solve overlapping or conflicting interests, the actions of non-state actors pose a high degree of uncertainty.

STATE OF READINESS

That leads to my next point: the state of preparedness or readiness of the MAF. Militaries around the world today are expected to carry out a wide array of tasks. To be prepared for this entire spectrum of military operations, routine training and a sense of realism are of paramount importance.

These highly varied operations range from peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian and disaster relief, counter-piracy, counter-trafficking, border protection, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, just to name a few.

These operations are collectively known as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). It may be argued these are not the core duties of the armed forces. However, as is often the case, the military is tasked to conduct these operations due to their inherent capacity, organisation, training and discipline. Dag Hammarskjöld, a former UN secretary-general, once astutely observed that peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it!

Shouldered with such a wide array of tasks, the MAF needs to be equipped with mission-specific equipment. The actual equipment used for these operations must be available for training, before a force can be categorised as mission-capable and professional. It is unreasonable to deploy soldiers, seamen and airmen for operations without this level of preparedness and training. Having said that, it is unthinkable that a Malaysian serviceman, with ingrained values of duty, loyalty and honour, will refuse combat, despite the deficiencies he experiences.

DEFENCE SPENDING

Malaysia is not entangled in any arms race as there is no such race going on regionally. One can actually compare the assets of various militaries in the region to see that they are all vastly different to suit each countries' needs. Deducing a non-existent arms race based on our increased defence spending is also inaccurate. The rising cost of weapons and defence-related products parallel surges in commodity and consumer goods.

It must also be appreciated that regional geopolitical realities require the nation to maintain a sizeable standing army. We cannot afford to shrink the MAF any further. It is a fallacy to tinker with the notion that in times of crisis, we can raise a credible fighting force using our existing reserves (territorial army). Undeniably, defence is an insurance and allocations made available for defence spending is a premium which the nation can ill-afford not to expend. However, consultative dialogues on this process should be welcomed and, where possible, engaged by a cross section of our public interest groups.

Based on its present tasks and future challenges, the MAF has envisioned a strategic plan to transform itself into a balanced, conventional fighting force by 2020. This Fourth Dimension Malaysian Armed Forces (4D MAF) plan requires a substantial amount of funds for the procurement of new assets, and upgrades to existing ones. Given the realities of our economy, it is unlikely that the MAF will get allocations for all it "wants". Thus, the management of "scarce" defence resources has to be prioritised by the Defence Ministry.

They should start by establishing a capability planning and management organisation. This organisation, made up of defence experts and academics, should adopt a methodical approach to capability development. Most modern militaries have adopted a "capability-based approach" to defence readiness planning. This concept provides a deliberate and universally applicable means to turn transformational concepts and operational requirements into fielded capabilities that can meet current and future concerns.

This model looks collectively into a broad spectrum of defence needs, namely doctrine, organisation, training, material, leadership, education, personnel and facilities.

In terms of procurement of major assets, a clear and transparent procurement policy is needed to match the best practices available anywhere in the world. Such a policy, formulated by an independent panel made up of administrators and lawmakers from both sides of the political divide, should look into issues of procurement integrity. This should help eliminate allegations of wastage, seepage, abuse and fraud. Such accusations constantly bedevil defence procurements the world over.

In the past, details of purchases were often highly classified for national security purposes. Transparency was considered undesirable. But today, this approach is objectionable as almost all international defence procurements are subject to strict scrutiny by the governments of equipment manufacturers as well as the international media.

In any case, contract details and technical specifications of purchased defence hardware are often uploaded onto the public domain in no time. Transparency is the desired future wave.

Finally, defence managers need to adopt and apply analytical methods in decision making vis-à-vis the expending of limited defence resource. As the newly established security organisations in Sabah become operational, budgetary constraints would be felt across the entire MAF.

The ministry should from the onset ensure that allocation and use of these scarce resources produces the "biggest bang for the buck". In the long run, transparency and accountability will demand these resources are wisely spent.