To me this is a good academic case study - 'was this a Ponzi scheme or just a simple scam?'
Another question often discussed is - 'what is the key differences between legal MLM and illegal Pyramid schemes?'
Ponzi schemes collapse when outgoing obligations exceed incoming deposits. In this case, the business model is much simpler. Company sells gold at 25-30% above market rate, and rebates 1.8-2.5% each month
for a short period of time, e.g. 3 months (see bottom). That gives a handsome profit. When there are no longer any new buyers, existing buyers walk away with overpriced gold in their hands. Because this is what BNM sees on paper, it's caveat emptor but legal.
Obviously nobody would fall for such a cheap trick, so the company hires consultants on commission to sell the idea of passive income, by convincing people that as long as they keep buying and selling back every 3-6 months with no transaction costs (no spread, no fees, no commission), they get a lifetime of passive income paid monthly. Unethical sales tactics but very common. This lie was made convincing because the company actually allowed buybacks at original price for as long as the company could sustain it, even when the company was never obliged to. This loss-making 'blue ocean' strategy is Ponzi-like, with the intention of attracting as many gullible buyers as possible.
When the company has as many gullible buyers as they can afford, they can happily pull the plug and legally refuse to buyback any more of their gold.
If you want to plot a chart for best time to pull the plug:
The company had 3,000 buyers in 2009, which grew exponentially to 65,000 now. In the company scoreboard, it can sustain a nett positive profit from your transaction for 12-15 months (basically initial profit of 30%, then slowly deducting 1-3% until we break-even). In the scoreboard, the company has made obvious losses for the early birds, having paid them back several times more than they have profited. Nevertheless, that strategy have helped them attract another 50k or so late-comers, for which the company is still nett positive.
If you see it as a simple Excel tabulation of nett position of company vs. each individual buyer:
Buyer 1, in for 36 months - company in nett loss (paid 36 months worth of hibah)
Buyer 2, in for 35 months - company in nett loss.
Buyer 3, in for 34 months - company in nett loss.
Buyer 100, in for 24 months - company in nett loss.
Buyer 1000, in for 15 months - company at break-even.
Buyer 1001, in for 15 months - company at break-even.
Buyer 10,000, in for 12 months - company still at nett profit.
Buyer 20,000, in for 9 months - company still at nett profit.
Buyer 30,000, in for 6 months - company still at nett profit.
Buyer 40,000, in for 3 months - company still at nett profit.
Buyer 50,000, in for 2 months - company still at nett profit.
Buyer 60,000, in for 1 month - company still at nett profit.
Indeed, the early birds have actually profited much from the scheme, at the expense of gullible late-comers. The final trick is when and how to end the scheme. Imagine if the scheme is ended now, unlike most Ponzi schemes, the company can easily walk away with handsome profit. (I know in actual fact BNM says that Genneva doesn't have the capacity to pay back all the buyers, but that is why this is a case study of future scenarios operating the same scheme.)
I am more interested to find out whether this was technically a Ponzi.
Genneva aside, if any company can technically and theoretically be able to deliver physical goods to every single buyer, and then close shop with profits, is it still a Ponzi scheme? Yes, 80-90% of the buyers are caught with a nett loss, but that is because of their own gullibility in legally and voluntarily buying expensive gold.
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Oh yes btw, below is an example of gold buyback at RM221 per gram, after 3 months.

And below is another example of gold buyback at RM184 per gram. Same buyback form, different S&P dates.
